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In the last thirty years, economists and other social scientists have investigated 
people’s normative views on distributive justice. Here we study people’s normative 
views in social dilemmas, which underlie many situations of economic and social 
significance. Using insights from moral philosophy and psychology we provide an 
analysis of the morality of free riding. We use experimental survey methods to 
investigate people’s moral judgments empirically. We vary others’ contributions, the 
framing (“give-some” vs. “take-some”) and whether contributions are simultaneous or 
sequential. We find that moral judgments of a free rider depend strongly on others’ 
behaviour; and that failing to give is condemned more strongly than withdrawing all 
support. 
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  11. Introduction 
Prominent among Amartya Sen’s many enduring contributions are his 
arguments for enrichment of the concept of agency used in economic analysis and of 
the information base of welfare economics.
1  Although these arguments suggest that 
an individual’s normative views may be relevant both to the explanation of her 
behaviour and to her evaluations of states of affairs, they also suggest that it may be 
hard to infer normative views directly from choice behaviour.           
A striking recent development in public economics, reflecting this difficulty, 
has been increasing use of data on people’s normative attitudes obtained with surveys 
or questionnaires. For example, views about distributive justice and redistributive 
policy have been examined by Fong (2001), Gaertner et al. (2001), Corneo and 
Grüner (2002), Faravelli (2007), Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007), and Corneo and 
Fong (2008).
2  In this paper, we extend the empirical investigation of normative views 
to a different economic context, namely social dilemma (public goods) games, and a 
different type of normative view, namely moral judgment.
3 More specifically, we 
report an experiment that, using techniques adapted from moral psychology, explores 
how people judge the morality of a free rider in a social dilemma game.    
A social dilemma arises when members of a group share the benefits of a common 
resource but each has to decide individually how much to contribute to its provision.  
Contribution is costly to the contributor but helps all other group members.  Thus, a 
social dilemma isolates a conflict between personal interest, which militates for free 
riding, and collective interest, which requires contribution.  The ubiquity of social 
dilemmas makes them important for economics and social science; and the conflict of 
interest they embody makes them potentially fruitful ground for the empirical study of 
moral judgments.  In fact, there are arguments to the effect that the conception of 
morality itself evolved in response to cooperation problems our ancestors faced.
4           
Previous research has shown that people experience negative emotions towards 
free riders in social dilemmas and that some are willing to incur costs to punish them.
5 
However, little is known about people’s moral judgment of free riders. Although it 
                                                 
1  See, for example, the essays collected in Sen (1982a)and Sen (2002). 
2 See Konow (2003) and Gaertner (2009) for overviews. 
3 Moral judgments can be “defined as evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or character of a person 
that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture” (Haidt 
(2001), p. 817). 
4 e.g. Ridley (1996); Binmore (2005); Hauser (2006); Gintis et al. (2008), Krebs (2008). 
5 e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2000); Fehr and Gächter (2002); Fehr and Fischbacher (2004); Cubitt et al. 
(2008); Gächter and Herrmann (2009). 
  2seems that many people dislike free riders when directly affected by their behaviour, 
it does not follow that free riding is viewed as morally reprehensible.  Croson and 
Konow (2009) provide evidence of a difference between normative judgments 
reached from the standpoints of “stakeholder” and impartial observer in dictator 
games; and the same difference could apply in social dilemmas.  W e  a s k :  w h e n  
judgment is not confounded with self-interest from being an affected party, is free 
riding still judged to be wrong?  And, if so, what factors influence how severe a 
transgression it is seen as?   
In our study, subjects (n=538) were confronted with hypothetical scenarios 
involving a two-player public goods game in which one player free rides. For each 
scenario, subjects were asked to express their positive or negative moral rating of the 
free rider, without themselves being involved in the decision situation. As they were 
merely observers, their judgments should represent impartial moral evaluations.  
Our experimental design manipulates three aspects of the scenarios. First, we 
manipulate the behaviour of the non-judged player to see whether subjects’ moral 
judgments of the free rider depend on this. Our second manipulation investigates how 
moral judgments depend on the order of moves in the scenarios.  In particular, we 
explore whether the sensitivity of judgments of the free rider to the action of the non-
judged player is affected by whether the free rider knew the other player’s behaviour 
when choosing his own.  Third, we explore whether moral judgments are sensitive to 
contextual cues provided by the framing of the decision problem. The framing 
manipulation we study has a Give versus Take form.  This manipulation is common in 
studies of social dilemma games,
6 but its impact on moral judgments in that context 
has not been studied before, to our knowledge.  
We find that that free riding is perceived as a morally blameworthy action in all 
our scenarios, except for one case in which it is seen as morally praiseworthy.  The 
exceptional case is the one, which we will call “ratting on a rat”, in which the judged 
free rider moves second, after observing that the other player has free ridden too. We 
provide evidence that, irrespective of whether moves are simultaneous or sequential, 
the higher is the other player’s contribution, the more negative is the moral rating 
assigned to the free rider on average.  Interestingly, this pattern of judgments is also 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Brewer and Kramer (1986); McDaniel and Sistrunk (1991); Andreoni (1995); 
McCusker and Carnevale (1995); Sell and Son (1997);  Sonnemans et al. (1998); Park (2000); van Dijk 
and Wilke (2000); Rege and Telle (2004); and Dufwenberg et al. (2010).  
  3observed at an individual level for a substantial minority of subjects in the 
simultaneous case and for an overwhelming majority in the sequential case. Finally, 
we find a strong framing effect in moral evaluations: other things equal, subjects 
condemn withdrawing support from the public good less than the corresponding 
equivalent action of failing to contribute to it. 
We see these findings as a contribution not just to economics but also to the 
emerging literature in moral psychology and empirical moral philosophy (Haidt 
(2001), Nichols (2004), Haidt (2007), Nado et al. (2009)).  This literature investigates 
how people arrive at moral judgments in a number of contexts.  By extending it to 
cover free riding in social dilemmas, we make a contribution that is both conceptual 
and empirical.  We analyse a typical experimental social dilemma problem from the 
perspectives of two accounts of how people form moral judgments: the reason-based 
model and the emotion-based model.  Although our experimental design is not 
intended to test between those models, each model provides a distinct framework for 
analysing how our experimental manipulations may affect moral judgments.  We 
explain this in Section 3, after describing our main design features in Section 2.   
Section 4 gives details of experimental procedures. Finally, Section 5 presents, and 
Section 6 discusses, our empirical results.
7       
    
2. Experimental design: scenarios and treatments 
In our experiment, each subject responded to a questionnaire requiring her to 
report her moral judgment of a player in hypothetical scenarios.  There were four 
treatments, each defined by a different questionnaire.  Each subject responded to the 
questionnaire for one treatment only. 
Each questionnaire described a decision problem for two fictitious players, named 
Person A and Person B; and then gave some possible endings, each of which specified 
players’ choices and their consequences.  A scenario comprises a description of a 
decision problem and an ending.  Each questionnaire consisted of five scenarios with 
the same decision problem, but different endings. 
In all scenarios, the players were the two members of a group playing a public 
good game. Within each questionnaire, the behaviour of Person A varied across 
scenarios but Person B was always a complete free-rider. After each ending, the 
                                                 
7  For readers more interested in the empirical contribution than the conceptual one, it is possible to 
skip or skim Section 3, though doing so carries a cost in terms of understanding parts of Section 6. 
  4subject was asked, as a detached observer, to rate the morality of Person B on a scale 
ranging from -50 (extremely bad) to +50 (extremely good). Thus, in each treatment, 
we can test within-subjects for the impact of the behaviour of the non-judged player 
on the moral rating assigned to the free rider. All other tests are between-subjects and 
involve comparisons of subjects’ responses across treatments.  
There were two treatment variables: the framing used to describe the decision 
problem; and the order of moves in that problem. Each variable had two possible 
values: “Give” and “Take” for framing; and “Simultaneous” and “Sequential” for 
order of moves. Each was manipulated independently, yielding four treatments: Give-
Simultaneous, Take-Simultaneous, Give-Sequential, and Take-Sequential.     
To explain the Give versus Take manipulation, we fix on the Simultaneous order 
of moves. In the Give frame, the decision facing each player was how much to 
contribute to a group project; in the Take frame, it was how much to withdraw.  The 
first scenarios in the Give-Simultaneous and Take-Simultaneous treatments are shown 
in the left-hand and right-hand columns below respectively.  (To show the difference 
between them, we present corresponding Give and Take scenarios side by side here, 
using bold face for each phrase which differs from the corresponding one in the other 
framing.  However, bold face was not used for these passages when scenarios were 
presented to subjects and, as explained above, no subject saw both frames). 
Give-Simultaneous Take-Simultaneous 
  
Imagine a group that consists of two group 
members, Person A and Person B. Each group 
member receives an endowment of 20 tokens and 
has to decide how many tokens to keep for 
himself and how many to contribute to a group 
project.  Each token he keeps for himself has a 
value of one pound for him.  Each token 
contributed to the group project has a value of 
1.50 pounds to the project.  The total value of the 
project is divided equally between the two group 
members.   So, each token contributed to the 
project earns both group members 0.75 pounds 
each.  The total income of a group member is the 
sum earned from tokens kept for himself and his 
share of the earnings of the group project.  Each 
group member decides simultaneously, that is, 
without knowing what the other one has done. 
 
 
A) Assume that Person A contributes 0 tokens to 
the group project and Person B contributes 0 
tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value 
of the group project is 0 pounds and, thus, as a 
result of their contributions, Person A’s total 
Imagine a group that consists of two group 
members, Person A and Person B. There are 40 
tokens in a group project. Each group member 
has to decide how many, up to a maximum of 20, 
of these tokens to withdraw for himself and how 
many to leave in the group project.  Each token 
he  withdraws for himself has a value of one 
pound for him.  Each token left in the group 
project has a value of 1.50 pounds to the project.  
The total value of the project is divided equally 
between the two group members.  So, each token 
left in the project earns both group members 0.75 
pounds each.  The total income of a group 
member is the sum earned from tokens withdrawn 
by himself and his share of the earnings of the 
group project.  Each group member decides 
simultaneously, that is, without knowing what the 
other one has done. 
 
A) Assume that Person A withdraws 20 tokens 
from the group project and Person B withdraws 
20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the 
value of the group project is 0 pounds and, thus, 
as a result of their withdrawals, Person A’s total 
  5income is 20 pounds and Person B’s total income 
is 20 pounds. 
income is 20 pounds and Person B’s total income 
is 20 pounds. 
 
The scenarios within each questionnaire differed from each other only in Person 
A’s behaviour. In the Give-Simultaneous treatment, Person A’s contribution was 0 
tokens (as shown) in the first scenario, rising to 20 in increments of 5 over the other 
four scenarios.  In the Take-Simultaneous treatment, Person A’s withdrawal was 20 
tokens (as shown) in the first scenario, declining to 0 in decrements of 5 over the other 
four scenarios.  In all scenarios, the last sentence specified the incomes to Person A 
and Person B resulting from their joint behaviour; and then the subject was asked 
“How do you rate Person B’s morality?” (bold face in original). 
The Give and Take frames differ only in the description of the scenarios. There is 
no difference in terms of the feasible sets of monetary outcomes available to a player 
in corresponding scenarios In each frame, each player controlled the final destination 
of 20 tokens, each of which could be allocated either to himself (earning £1 for him) 
or to the project (earning £0.75 for each player). In view of this, we use the term 
“effective contribution” below to refer to the tokens allocated by a player to the 
project, regardless of whether this was by means of contributing or not withdrawing.      
In addition to the Simultaneous treatments, we ran two treatments (one with the 
Give frame, and one with Take) in which the non-judged player moved first. Each 
questionnaire for these Sequential treatments was obtained from the corresponding 
Simultaneous one by replacing the last sentence of the first paragraph with “Assume 
that Person A decides first and Person B observes Person A’s choice before making 
his own decision.” In all other respects, Sequential questionnaires were identical to 
the corresponding Simultaneous ones.     
 
3. Discussion of design from the perspective of moral psychology and philosophy 
The philosophical and psychological literatures suggest two broad accounts of 
how individuals might arrive at their moral judgments which, for convenience, we call 
the reason-based model and the emotion-based model, respectively.
8        
                                                 
8 The reason-based model can be seen as a descendent of rationalist traditions in philosophy associated 
with Descartes, Leibniz and Kant.  (However, it is important that what we call here the reason-based 
model does not require agents to endorse Kantian moral principles.)  The emotion-based model has 
more affinity with naturalistic traditions in philosophy associated with Hume and Smith.  For more 
recent discussions of the philosophical and psychological background on moral judgments, see e.g., 
Haidt (2001); Nichols (2004); Doris and Stich (2005); Hauser (2006); Joyce (2006); Prinz (2006); Prinz 
(2007); Krebs (2008); Sinnott-Armstrong (2008); DeScioli and Kurzban (2009); Nado et al. (2009). 
  6The reason-based model sees an individual’s moral judgments as the result of 
deliberation in which the prior moral principles she endorses are applied to the case at 
hand. On this account, hypotheses about how subjects’ judgments will vary across 
scenarios would be conditional on assumptions about their prior moral principles and, 
in particular, about whether those principles imply that the differences between our 
scenarios are morally relevant.   
In contrast, the emotion-based model sees emotions and intuitions as the drivers 
of moral judgments. On this view, moral judgments express sentiments, caused by 
quickly-formed moral intuitions which may be followed by ex post moral reasoning.
9 
On the emotion-based model, whether and how far subjects report different judgments 
across scenarios would depend on whether there are differences in the nature and 
intensity of the emotional responses cued by them. 
To facilitate our discussion of how our experimental manipulations would be seen 
by these two models of judgment, we begin by giving names to certain hypotheses. 
We refer to the view that moral judgments are insensitive to the Give versus Take 
manipulation as the frame insensitivity hypothesis. 
Correspondingly, the independence hypothesis asserts that the moral rating of 
Person B is independent of Person A’s effective contribution.  Note that the 
independence hypothesis could hold in either Simultaneous or Sequential treatments, 
but (as we will see) the arguments that would motivate it in the two cases may be 
different.  If the independence hypothesis holds under one order of moves, but not the 
other, this would induce a difference between Sequential and Simultaneous treatments 
for some otherwise identical scenarios. 
If judgments of Person B are sensitive to Person A’s effective contribution, it 
seems most likely that this will take the form that the higher is Person A’s effective 
contribution, the less favourable is the moral rating assigned to Person B. We refer to 
this as the increasing condemnation hypothesis.  We focus on this (potential) direction 
of effect as, although Person B’s effective contribution is always 0 tokens, the 
effective contribution of Person A rises across the successive endings of each 
questionnaire, leading to outcomes that are progressively less favourable to Person A 
and more favourable to Person B, both in relative and absolute terms. Each increment 
of 5 tokens in Person A’s effective contribution reduces Person A’s monetary payoff 
                                                 
9 For experimental evidence, see Greene et al. (2001) and Wheatley and Haidt (2005). For overviews, 
see Haidt (2001); Greene and Haidt (2002) and Haidt (2007). 
  7by £1.25, while increasing that of Person B by £3.75. Thus, although each player 
receives £20 in the first scenario of each questionnaire, by the last scenario, Person A 
receives £15 and Person B £35.   
 
The reason-based model 
The implications of the reason-based model depend on the prior ethical principles 
that subjects endorse and, especially, on whether these are consequentialist.
10 
For a consequentialist ethical theory, the moral value of an action derives from 
comparison of its consequences with other feasible ones; so re-describing the decision 
problem, holding actual and feasible consequences constant, should have no impact 
on the moral value of the action. Thus, if our subjects endorse any form of 
consequentialism that sees the morally relevant consequences in our scenarios as 
determined by the monetary outcomes, the reason-based model predicts that the frame 
insensitivity hypothesis will hold.  For the remainder of the paper, by 
“consequentialism” we intend a form of the doctrine that has this implication.
11  Thus, 
if we observe a difference between judgments in the Give and Take frames, the 
reason-based model would have to interpret it as evidence of subjects endorsing prior 
ethical principles that are not consequentialist in the sense just described. 
The consequentialist argument for frame insensitivity requires the morally 
relevant consequences of Person B’s free-riding to be determined by the monetary 
outcomes, but it does not depend on how broadly those outcomes are construed.   
If they take a narrow view, subjects could see the consequences of Person B’s 
action as consisting only of the payments determined by the tokens in his own control.  
This would imply that the “consequence” of Person B making an effective 
contribution of zero tokens is the same across all scenarios.  Then, in addition to 
frame insensitivity, the independence hypothesis would hold in Simultaneous 
                                                 
10 Blackburn (2008), p. 74, defines consequentialism as the view that the “value of an action derives 
entirely from its consequences”.  For an extensive philosophical discussion, see Sinnott-Armstrong 
(2006); for a discussion from an economic point of view see Sen (1987). 
11 When faced with counter-examples, a possible defensive move for advocates of consequentialism 
might reinterpret consequences to include factors previously not seen as part of them. If “contributing 
no tokens” and “withdrawing 20 tokens” are interpreted as acts with different consequences, perhaps 
because only one leads to the “consequence” that a withdrawal has been made, then a framing effect in 
our design would be compatible with subjects making consequentialist judgments, in the reinterpreted 
sense. However, taken to the limit, this reinterpretation strategy risks abolishing any distinction 
between an action and its consequences, so rendering consequentialism trivial.       
  8treatments, and in Sequential treatments, and with no difference between 
Simultaneous and Sequential.   
However, if subjects take a broad view and see the consequences of Person B’s 
free riding as including all monetary payments that arise in a given scenario, the 
independence hypothesis might fail (at least in Sequential treatments).  For example, 
it would be consistent with a broad view for the difference between (or ratio of) the 
payoffs to each player to be seen as a morally-relevant feature of the consequences of 
Person B’s free riding.  If subjects are consequentialist in the broad sense, and averse 
to unequal outcomes, this creates the potential for the increasing condemnation 
hypothesis to hold. Any increase in Person A’s effective contribution tilts relative 
payoffs (further) in Person B’s favour, if Person B continues to free ride.  If this is 
seen as an undesirable outcome, then the obligation on Person B to avoid it may 
strengthen; and, if so, one would expect Person B to be condemned more strongly for 
continuing to free ride.  Thus, broad consequentialism can generate, out of an attitude 
towards unequal outcomes, a view that Person B ought to match Person A’s effective 
contribution.  If subjects reason in this way, one might expect the increasing 
condemnation hypothesis to hold in Sequential treatments, since Person B must be 
held responsible for (what a broad consequentialist sees as) the different, and known, 
consequences of his actions across the five scenarios in a Sequential treatment. 
It is harder to formulate moral principles that rationalise conformity with the 
increasing condemnation hypothesis in Simultaneous treatments, as they would have 
to license condemning Person B differently, given different effective contributions by 
Person A, even though Person B is neither responsible for nor knows Person A’s 
choice.  We will call the principle that an agent cannot be condemned on the basis of 
matters which he neither controls nor knows the responsibility doctrine.  If subjects 
endorse this principle then, even if they are otherwise inclined to view consequences 
broadly, the independence hypothesis would hold in Simultaneous treatments. 
However, there are ethical views which violate the responsibility doctrine and 
might account for increasing condemnation even in Simultaneous treatments.  At first 
sight, this may seem a strange property for moral principles.  But, within a broad 
consequentialist framework, rationalisation for it can be found in the doctrine of 
moral luck, discussed by Nagel (1976) and Williams (1981).   
According to this doctrine, an agent can be blamed for outcomes of their actions 
to which chance, or other matters outside their control, have contributed. As an 
  9example, Nagel argues that a driver who has negligently failed to check his brakes 
“would have to blame himself” (emphasis added) much more if a child runs into the 
road and is killed than if no situation arises which requires sharp braking, even though 
his negligence is the same in each case, and he neither predicted nor had any control 
over the child’s action.  By analogy, in the current context, one might see it as bad 
moral luck for Person B if Person A makes a non-zero effective contribution, so 
turning his own free riding into unilateral free-riding (and worse moral luck the 
higher is Person A’s effective contribution).  Then, the moral luck doctrine would 
license blaming Person B more, as Person A’s effective contribution rises.  
Finally, note that there is nothing in the reason-based model that requires subjects 
to be consequentialist.  If subjects endorse deontological moral principles instead, 
then the reason-based model predicts that they would apply those principles to form 
their judgments.  Deontological views see the moral status of an action as flowing, not 
from its consequences, but from its intrinsic properties.  For example, it might be seen 
as intrinsically wrong to commit murder even if, by some bizarre twist of fate, one 
could bring about net beneficial consequences by doing so. 
In our context, if the intrinsic properties of Person B’s free riding are to be 
distinguished from consequences, it seems inevitable that they can take no account of 
Person A’s action when Person B is unaware of it.  Thus, deontological forms of the 
reason-based model would lead us to expect the independence hypothesis to hold in 
Simultaneous treatments. 
Whether it would also hold in Sequential treatments would depend on whether 
the intrinsic properties of Person B’s free riding are sensitive to Person A’s choice, 
when that is known to Person B.  If not (for example, because free riding is seen as 
intrinsically and unconditionally wrong) then the independence hypothesis would be 
expected to hold in Sequential treatments, as well as in Simultaneous.  But, a different 
view might rationalise increasing condemnation, for example if taking revenge on 
Person A when he has free ridden, or failing to reward him when he has contributed, 
are seen as intrinsic properties of Person B’s free riding in different scenarios.  If the 
former is morally acceptable but the latter is not then this view would require the 
increasing condemnation hypothesis, but only in Sequential treatments.   
Finally, if withdrawing and withholding support are seen as intrinsically different 
actions, application of deontological moral principles could also account for frame 
sensitivity of judgments of the free rider. 
  10The emotion-based model       
On the emotion-based model, it is not necessary to delve into such tricky terrain 
to account for violations of frame insensitivity and/or the independence hypothesis, 
because the model does not require moral judgments to flow from coherent principles.  
Instead, it sees them as cued by emotional responses to the scenario as a whole. 
Evolutionary theorists argue that moral judgments may be situation-specific and 
frame-dependent (e.g., Krebs (2008), p. 116). Consistent with this argument, the 
emotion-based model suggests that subjects’ judgments would be driven by gut-
reactions to whole scenarios which, in turn, may be sensitive to seemingly incidental 
features of them.  For example, the emotional response to a player whose effective 
contribution is zero might differ according to whether this free riding arises from 
complete failure to contribute to the project or from maximal withdrawal of support 
from it. This is possible even though the consequences are the same, and even in the 
absence of a prior ethical theory that licenses the distinction. 
Similarly, it is easy to imagine how Person A’s choice might affect a subject’s 
emotional response to a scenario in which Person B free rides, even when their 
choices are simultaneous.  The subject might be more angered, or disgusted, or 
saddened, by a scenario in which Person B free rides the larger is Person A’s effective 
contribution.  For example, negative emotional responses to payoff inequality or to 
inequality of contributions could bring this about. 
Although it is possible that emotional responses would vary between 
Simultaneous and Sequential versions of otherwise identical scenarios, the emotion-
based model need not confine the increasing condemnation hypothesis to the 
Sequential treatment, since emotional responses are responses to the whole scenario.  
Gino et al. (2009) provide evidence of an outcome bias in ethical judgment.  Such a 
bias arises when the assessment of an action is influenced by ex post information 
about its outcome that was not available to the decision-maker.  In our context, a 
similar bias might take the form of Person B being condemned most strongly when it 
turns out his free riding was unilateral, even though he did not know that at the 
moment of choice. This would lead one to expect conformity with the increasing 
condemnation hypothesis in Simultaneous treatments, use of the word “bias” 
indicating that, on this view, there need be no principled justification for the 
phenomenon. 
  11Table 1 summarises the discussion of this section.  For each of the two models of 
moral judgment, the Table indicates the factors that would determine whether, and 
how, manipulation of the framing of the decision problem and of the non-judged 
player’s behaviour should affect judgments of Person B’s free riding.  (For 
manipulation of Player A’s choice, we distinguish between Sequential and 
Simultaneous treatments.)  A bullet-point saying that the framing of the decision 
problem has “No effect, if ….” indicates assumptions under which the frame 
insensitivity hypothesis should hold.  Similarly, a bullet-point saying that Player A’s 
choice has “No effect if ….” indicates assumptions under which the independence 
hypothesis should hold. 
Table 1 about here 
 
4.  Procedures 
We recruited participants from among University of Nottingham students using 
the ORSEE software (Greiner (2004). In total, we sent 2,718 email invitations, 
resulting in 538 participants. Once a subject registered to take part, they were directed 
to the experiment’s website and allocated automatically to one of the four treatments, 
in a rotating sequence by time of registration for the experiment.  
Each subject saw only the questionnaire for the treatment they were assigned to.  
They could either respond to it immediately or exit or return to it any time before the 
closing date of the experiment (which was one week after invitations were sent). 
Subjects returning later could still only see the questionnaire they had been assigned 
to initially. Subjects were omitted from the data analysis if they failed to complete a 
questionnaire by the closing date.
12 To counter the possibility of multiple submissions 
from the same subject, only one registration was permitted from a given invitation.  
By using and extending ORSEE recruitment software, rather than employing an open 
internet experiment, we were able to build in this safeguard and to insure that no 
invitees had been recruited to previous public goods experiments.  
It is inherent to our study that we could not incentivise task-responses, but we 
could incentivise participation. We comment on these features in turn.   
                                                 
12 This resulted in the following number of participants: Give-Simultaneous – 135; Take-Simultaneous 
– 138; Give-Sequential – 128; Take-Sequential – 137.  
  12Our objective was to study subjects’ impartial moral attitudes.
13  A questionnaire-
based approach was appropriate for this purpose because any means of tying 
payments to subjects’ responses would introduce a potential confound.
 14 In particular, 
we wished to elicit judgments that subjects would give in the role of a disinterested 
observer. This precluded having subjects be participants in the public goods game: 
hence our use of hypothetical scenarios. Allowing subjects to assign financial 
penalties or rewards to the players in the scenarios, even hypothetically, would have 
confounded moral attitudes with attempts to bring about particular distributional 
consequences: hence our use of pure judgment tasks rather than – say – reward or 
punishment tasks. As our judgment tasks are moral judgment tasks, as opposed – say 
– to mathematical puzzles or judgments of distance, there are no objectively “right” or 
“wrong” answers to them. So, we could not reward subjects for judging correctly. 
Finally, rewarding subjects for making judgments that conform to particular ethical 
theories, or to our own ethical views, or to average opinion, would all have introduced 
obvious biases, relative to the motivation for our experiment. Our aim was to elicit 
subjects’ own actual judgements, not their beliefs about which judgments would be 
rewarded or are held by others.
15  
Given the absence of task-related incentives, we felt that it might be difficult to 
generate a sufficient number of participants, without some participation incentive. On 
the other hand, having a substantial reward for participation might have attracted 
subjects unwilling to give considered responses and only willing to do the minimum 
necessary to obtain the reward. It might also disproportionally attract people for 
whom pecuniary concerns are particularly important. In the light of these 
considerations, we used two approaches in parallel. Prior to issuing invitations, we 
divided our potential subject pool randomly into two equal sub-groups: one for which 
there would be no payments at all (“No-Payment experiment”) and one in which a 
random participation fee was provided (“Payment” experiment), in the form of entry 
                                                 
13  For interesting discussions of impartiality in ethical reasoning, see Sen (1993) and Sen (2009). 
14 The use of non-incentivised surveys and questionnaire-based experiments is standard in the study of 
mental states and social attitudes. For example, the recent literature on self-reported happiness (see 
Clark et al. (2008), for a survey and the August 2008 Journal of Public Economics symposium for 
recent examples) relies on non-incentivised responses, as do surveys of attitudes such as the World 
Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).  Similar methods have been used to study 
preferences for redistribution and perceptions of fairness by Kahneman et al. (1986), Anand (2001), 
and Gächter and Riedl (2006), as well as the papers mentioned in the first paragraph of Section 1. 
15 See Krupka and Weber (2008) for an experiment where people are rewarded for guessing which 
norms other people hold. Their interest is in eliciting what people think the social norm is whereas we 
are interested in the individual’s own moral judgments. 
  13to a lottery. The latter provided some protection against low participation, while 
conducting both experiments enabled us to check for any effect of the participation 




Before turning to our main questions, we consider the impact of the different 
participation incentive schemes on participation and task-responses. This is a useful 
preliminary for what follows, as well as of some independent interest.  
We sent the same number of invitations to participate in each experiment; and, in 
response, 306 subjects completed the Payment experiment, compared with 232 in the 
No-Payment experiment. This suggests that paying a random participation fee can be 
an effective (and cheap) way to increase the response rate. A Probit regression 
analysis reported in the Appendix (Table A1) supports this conclusion.  
More importantly, the coefficient on the Payment variable in the regression 
analysis of moral evaluations reported in the Appendix (Table A2) is not statistically 
significant. Thus, it does not seem that the difference between the two experiments 
had any important impact on responses. In our view this indicates that there is no 
selection bias between those who participate in the two experiments.
17 We therefore 
proceed below by pooling the data. 
 
5.1 How is free riding judged? The Simultaneous Case 
We begin our main analysis with the Simultaneous treatments, in which, in each 
scenario, Person A and Person B decide without knowing the action of the other. 
Here, and below, the main tool for our analysis is the mean “moral evaluation 
function” (MEF).  This is an aggregate measure of the moral ratings that subjects 
assigned to the free rider (Person B), expressed as a function of the effective 
contribution levels of his non-judged counterpart (Person A). Figure 1 shows the 
mean MEF, for each of the two Simultaneous treatments.  
                                                 
16 All participants in either experiment were informed of the importance of answering the questionnaire 
as precisely and honestly as possible and that responses would remain confidential. Subjects invited to 
the Payment experiment were told that those who completed the questionnaire would be entered into a 
prize draw, conducted publicly with two prizes of £50.Participants were given the date, time, and venue 
of the draw and invited to attend; they were also told that the winners would be contacted by email if 
they did not attend, so that payment was not conditional on attendance. 
17 This result is consistent with Cleave et al. (2010) and Falk et al. (2010) who also did not find a 
selection bias with regard to subjects’ social preferences. 
  14Figure 1 about here 
The horizontal axis indicates Person A’s effective contribution, measured in number 
of tokens. The vertical axis indicates the average moral rating that subjects assigned to 
Person B, who is always a complete free rider. On this axis, the point 0 denotes that 
free riding is perceived to be of no moral significance. Ratings below 0 imply that 
subjects perceive free riding as morally blameworthy; whereas ratings above 0 imply 
that subjects perceive free riding as morally praiseworthy. The 95% confidence 
intervals for the mean moral evaluation in each of the five scenarios of each treatment 
are also shown. 
Three features of Figure 1 are particularly striking. First, the average moral rating 
of Person B’s free riding is negative in all cases shown, suggesting that subjects do 
regard the decision problem in the scenarios as having a moral dimension and free-
riding as a blameworthy act. Second, the MEF for the Give treatment is always below 
that for the Take treatment indicating that, on average, subjects condemn total failure 
to contribute to the group project more strongly than complete withdrawal of support 
from it. Third, for each frame, the MEF is negatively sloped: the free rider is 
condemned more strongly the greater the other player’s net contribution, even though 
moves are simultaneous. 
To understand the observed pattern of judgments better, we divided subjects into 
three categories (response patterns): (1) subjects with a flat MEF, (2) subjects with a 
negatively sloped MEF, and (3) “Others”, including non-monotonic subjects and 
subjects with a positively sloped MEF.
18  The mean MEFs for the Give and Take 
treatments, for each of these three response patterns, are shown in the three panels of 
Figure 2, respectively.  The percentage of subjects in the relevant treatment falling in 
a given category is shown, as are the 95% confidence intervals for the mean moral 
evaluation in each of the five scenarios. 
Figure 2 about here 
The largest category, accounting for 46.7% and 52.9% of subjects in Give and 
Take treatments respectively, consists of those whose MEF is flat across the five 
effective contribution levels of Person A. The overwhelming majority of subjects with 
a flat MEF assigned a negative rating to the free rider, and the average is indeed 
highly significantly negative in both treatments. (Only 12.8 percent of subjects 
                                                 
18 Non-monotonic subjects refer to those whose MEF is strictly negatively sloped in one range and 
strictly positively sloped in another. 
  15thought free riding is of no moral significance and therefore assigned a zero rating 
across all scenarios.) The second largest category is those subjects for whom free 
riding is more reprehensible the greater Person A’s effective contribution (38.5% and 
30.4% of subjects in Give and Take treatments, respectively). The third category 
(“Others”) comprises a minority (14.8% and 16.7% of subjects in Give and Take 
treatments, respectively) who have neither flat nor monotonically decreasing ratings. 
We also investigate moral evaluations in the simultaneous treatments 
econometrically.  Table 2 documents OLS models (with robust errors clustered on 
subjects), with the moral evaluation of Person B as the dependent variable. We report 
two sets of models. The first set of models (1) to (4) consists of a variable “Tokens”, 
which takes the values of Person A’s effective contribution (0, 5, 10, 15, 20); the 
dummy variable “Take”, which equals 1 for the Take treatment, and 0 for the Give 
treatment; the dummy variable “Male”, which equals 1 if subjects were male and 0 
otherwise; and finally an interaction variable “Tokens × Take”.  
Table 2 about here 
In model (1), which uses all subjects, we find that moral evaluations drop 
significantly in Person A’s effective contribution. Moral judgments are significantly 
higher in the Take treatment.  The interaction variable “Tokens × Take” and the 
dummy variable Male are insignificant. Models (2) to (4) separate subjects according 
to the shape of their MEF. Subjects with a negatively sloped MEF (model (2)) do not 
report significantly different moral evaluations in the Take treatment than in the Give 
treatment.  By contrast, subjects with a flat MEF (model (3)) and “Others” (model (4)) 
think free riding in Take is significantly less immoral than free riding in Give. The 
interaction variable “Tokens × Take” and the dummy “Male” are both insignificant in 
models (2) to (4).
19  
The second set of models discards the assumption of linearity in Tokens made in 
the previous set and splits the variable “Tokens” up into separate dummy variables for 
the different effective contribution levels of Person A (taking effective contribution of 
0 by Person A as the omitted benchmark).  This is redundant when the only subjects 
considered have flat MEFs.  But, for each of models (1), (2) and (4), there is a 
corresponding model (1′), (2′) and (4′) respectively, that uses the separate dummy 
variables just described in place of “Tokens”.  All conclusions from the first set of 
                                                 
19 We also ran a set of regressions including an interaction variable “Tokens × Male”. This interaction 
variable is not significant.  
  16models hold in these less restrictive ones as well. In particular, the mean MEF (model 
(1′)) is negatively sloped, ceteris paribus, since the coefficients of the four scenario 
dummy variables are all negative, statistically different from zero, and also jointly 
different from each other (from F-test, p-value = 0.000), corroborating the increasing 
condemnation hypothesis.
20  
It turns out that subjects with a flat MEF and subjects classified as “Others” are (at 
least weakly) significantly more condemning in the Give than in the Take treatment, 
whereas for subjects with negatively sloped MEFs frame insensitivity holds in that we 
find no statistically significant difference across frames.  Thus, the existence of a 
framing effect in our aggregate data for the Simultaneous treatments can be attributed 
largely to those subjects who condemn free riding equally across scenarios, or to 
“Others”. 
 
3.2 Do sequential moves make a difference? 
We now turn to the Sequential treatments, where Person B observes Person A’s 
choice before making his own decision.  An immediately striking feature is the 
relative sizes of categories of subject: in stark contrast to Simultaneous treatments, 
very few subjects in Sequential treatments (3.9% and 5.1% in Give-Sequential and 
Take-Sequential, respectively) have flat MEFs; instead, people with negatively sloped 
MEFs comprise by far the largest category (88.3% and 77.4% in Give-Sequential and 
Take-Sequential, respectively).  Given this preponderance of one category, we do not 
disaggregate by category in the remainder of the section.  Figure 3 illustrates our 
findings graphically, showing the mean MEF across all subjects facing Sequential 
treatments.  As before, 95% confidence intervals of mean evaluations are shown for 
each scenario.     
Figure 3 about here 
Comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 1 reveals some notable similarities and 
differences. Once again, for all scenarios where Player A’s effective contribution is 
non-zero, the mean moral evaluation of the free rider, Player B, is negative – 
indicating condemnation. Also, the mean MEF for the Give frame again lies below 
that for the Take frame whenever Person A’s effective contribution is non-zero, 
                                                 
20 We also ran pair wise Wald tests: 5 vs. 10 tokens (p=0.0051); 10 vs. 15 tokens (p=0.0574); 15 vs. 20 
tokens (p=0.0014).  
  17indicating that the framing effect observed in Simultaneous treatments is largely 
robust to a sequential order of moves.  
The main qualitative differences between Figure 3 and Figure 1 relate to the slope 
of the MEF, which appears steeper in the Sequential case. Especially when Player A’s 
effective contribution is 10 or more, the average condemnation of Player B is notably 
stronger in Sequential treatments than in the corresponding Simultaneous treatments. 
Also, interestingly, there is a directional difference in the judgment of Person B’s free 
riding, when Person A free rides too.  In contrast to the Simultaneous treatments, 
people in the Sequential treatments regarded it as morally praiseworthy for Player B 
to “rat on a rat”. 
Table 3 presents econometric analysis of the Sequential treatments.  The 
specifications are analogous to those of Table 2 (except that we do not disaggregate 
by category of subject).  Both Person A’s effective contribution and the Give versus 
Take framing have significant effects on the moral evaluation of Person B.  In model 
(1) of Table 3, this is reflected in significantly positive coefficients on “Tokens”, 
“Take” and the interaction variable “Tokens × Take”; in model (1′), it is shown by the 
significance of the interaction terms between the framing and scenario dummies.
 21 
Table 3 about here 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion of results 
This paper contributes to economics and moral psychology by investigating 
experimentally the moral judgments people pass on an important form of economic 
behaviour: free riding in public goods games. We see this as a small contribution 
towards a wider empirical research agenda on agents’ ethical views that can be seen 
as one response to Amartya Sen’s concern with the relationship between ethics and 
economics, especially as it relates to agents’ motivations. The idea that ethical 
commitments may affect behaviour without being reducible to preferences is a long-
standing argument of Sen’s (see, for example, Sen (1973) and Sen (1977)).  
Rather than free rider problems from the natural economy, we have used 
scenarios involving a two-player public goods game like those typically used in 
experimental investigations. Such investigations have played a major role in 
                                                 
21 In respect of Person A’s contributions, all pair wise comparisons (5 vs. 10 tokens; 10 vs. 15 tokens; 
15 vs. 20 tokens) are highly significantly different from each other (Wald tests, all with p<0.0001). 
  18generating stylized facts about the determinants of contributions to public goods
22 and 
in inspiring theory development.
23 Yet, whether people perceive a moral dimension to 
the interaction between them in public goods experiments and, if so, how their moral 
judgments vary with features of the interaction, has hitherto been unexplored.  This is 
the gap we address. 
Our study leaves interesting avenues for further research, including the 
relationship between moral judgments and (contribution and sanctioning) behaviour in 
experimental public goods games; and the robustness of our findings on judgment 
across alternative designs and across a wider range of social dilemmas, including 
more naturalistic ones, and/or across subject-pools more representative of the general 
population.
24  But, nevertheless, it provides a useful step in the empirical analysis of 
moral judgment of free riding.  Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
Finding 1: On average, free riding is judged morally reprehensible in all cases 
considered, except that it is judged morally commendable to “rat on a rat” (i.e. to 
free ride knowing that the co-player has already free ridden). 
   
Finding 2: Ceteris paribus, failure to contribute to the public good is condemned 
more strongly, on average, than total withdrawal of support from the public good. 
This holds both in the Simultaneous and the Sequential treatment. 
 
Finding 3: On average, moral judgments conform to the increasing condemnation 
hypothesis (that a free rider is condemned more strongly the larger is the effective 
contribution of his co-player).  In Simultaneous treatments, about half of subjects 
pass judgments on the free rider that are independent of the effective contribution 
of the other player. Yet, the overwhelming majority of subjects in Sequential 
treatments conform to the increasing condemnation hypothesis, as do a 
substantial minority in Simultaneous treatments.   
 
Finding 1 is the most fundamental, in that it suggests that public goods problems 
are perceived as having a moral dimension.  Subjects do not, in general, give neutral 
moral judgments of a free rider in our scenarios.  Given this, the question becomes 
what drives the judgments they do give.  Findings 2 and 3 are part of the answer to 
this question.  Together, they show that moral judgments of the free rider are sensitive 
                                                 
22   For overviews, see Ledyard (1995); Zelmer (2003); and Gächter and Herrmann (2009). 
23  See, for example, Gintis (2003); Fehr and Schmidt (2006); Fehr and Gintis (2007); and Gintis et al. 
(2008). 
24  For recent steps in a naturalistic direction using s similar impartial spectator method (albeit in 
different public policy contexts and using a different form of moral judgment), see Konow (2009).   
  19to the framing of the scenario and, in some cases, to the behaviour of the other player 
in it. 
We end by interpreting these findings from the perspectives of the reason-based 
and emotion-based models of moral judgment discussed in Section 3.   
Interpreted from the perspective of the reason-based model, our findings are 
indicators of the prior moral principles that subjects apply. For this view to account 
for Finding 2 would require that subjects endorse moral principles that distinguish 
between non-contribution and withdrawal, even when their monetary consequences 
are the same.  Such principles would have to be non-consequentialist.     
The reason-based model fits well with people who judge Person B equally across 
scenarios in the Simultaneous treatments, since doing so is consistent with the 
responsibility doctrine or with deontological moral principles. However, the reason-
based model can explain the commendation of ratting on a rat and, more generally, 
the greater prevalence of increasing condemnation in Sequential treatments than 
Simultaneous treatments, indicated by Finding 3, only if a substantial number of 
subjects endorse principles that call for some form of reciprocation. Even if they do, it 
would be difficult to account for the presence of a substantial minority who display 
increasing condemnation in Simultaneous treatments on the reason-based account 
unless some subjects are prepared, as a matter of principle, and in line with the moral 
luck doctrine, to condemn the free rider on the basis of actions taken by his co-player 
for which he is not directly responsible and of which he was unaware at the moment 
of choice.     
The emotion-based model of judgment suggests a different explanation of our 
findings. According to this model, judgments are ex post rationalizations of emotional 
or affective reactions to the scenarios. Even for impartial observers, free riding might 
cue emotions such as anger, disgust, irritation, or milder forms of distaste. On this 
view, increasing condemnation could arise from stronger affective reactions to 
scenarios that seem particularly unequal or unfair on the non-judged player. A further 
possibility, particularly applicable to the Sequential treatment, is that Person A is seen 
as trusting Person B to reciprocate when he makes a non-zero effective contribution, 
and that subjects experience a negative emotional response to the betrayal of this trust. 
If, in some judges, such reactions of distaste are cued more by relative effective 
contribution than by consideration of the facts known to the free rider, that would 
explain the presence of increasing condemnation in Simultaneous treatments (as well 
  20as in Sequential ones). Thus accounted for, the finding is in line with the outcome bias 
in ethical judgments identified by Gino et al. (2009).  Indeed, from this perspective, 
the surprising feature of our findings is not so much the presence of subjects who 
conform to the increasing condemnation hypothesis in Simultaneous treatments as the 
fact that the modal group does not do so.    
Emotional responses could also explain the positive evaluation of “ratting on a 
rat”, for example if there is a positive affective response to the first free rider getting 
what he deserved when the judged player free rides back.   
A priori, and given the findings of research in moral psychology (Haidt (2001)) 
the emotion-based model seems a promising way to explain framing effects in 
judgments, as it is quite possible that details of the description of different scenarios 
might cue different emotional responses. However, to explain the direction of the 
framing effect that we have observed requires more than just this remark and is not 
straightforward.  Our prior expectation was that, if framing made a difference, Player 
B’s free riding would be condemned more strongly when the Take frame is used 
because, in this case, a zero effective contribution involves abrogating for himself 
some part of the group project; whereas, in the Give frame, players are merely 
allocating their own endowment.  This conjecture can also be supported by the theory 
of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman (1991)), if the initial status quo is taken as 
the reference-point. On this view, Player A suffers a loss as a result of Player B’s 
action in the Take frame, but not in the Give frame. If subjects condemn the 
imposition of losses more strongly than the corresponding failure to grant a gain, 
Player B would be condemned more strongly in the Take frame, contrary to our 
Finding 2. 
One possible explanation of Finding 2 is that subjects take Person B to have been 
given a gift (i.e. the endowment) in the Give frame and condemn him for not sharing 
it; whereas they see the players as having to fend for themselves in the Take frame 
and are disinclined to judge them harshly for doing so.  A related possibility is that 
subjects see responsibility for the group project as more ambiguous in the Take frame 
than the Give frame, so cuing stronger moral responses in the latter case. 
To conclude, as this discussion shows, it is not straightforward to interpret all of 
our empirical findings; nor was our design intended to discriminate conclusively 
between the reason-based and emotion-based models.  But, one conclusion does seem 
clear: our findings cannot be explained by subjects forming their moral judgments by 
  21applying simple consequentialist moral principles. Instead, the picture of moral 
judgments which emerges from our study is one in which they respond to features of 
the whole situation, not just to the consequences of the judged action, narrowly 
conceived.
25  We suggest that, whilst it is not impossible to reconcile this feature of 
our findings with the reason-based model, the totality of the findings fits somewhat 
more easily with the emotions-based model.    
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  29Table 1: Analysis of impact of manipulations on moral judgments 
 
 Description  Impact  of 
Framing of decision 
problem 
Player A’s choice 
(Sequential treatments) 
Player A’s choice 
(Simultaneous treatments) 
Reason-based model 
(following rationalist tradition 
in moral philosophy) 
Judgments arise from 
application of prior moral 
principles to case in hand 
•  No effect, if principles 
are consequentialist. 
•  Frame sensitivity 
possible if principles 
are deontological and 
intrinsic properties of 
not giving and taking 
are different.  
•  No effect, if principles 
are narrow 
consequentialist. 
•  Increasing 
condemnation possible, 
if principles are broad 
consequentialist. 
•  If principles are 
deontological, depends 
whether intrinsic 
properties of B’s free 
riding are sensitive to 
A’s choice.  









or moral luck doctrine. 
Emotions-based model, 
(following naturalistic tradition 
in moral philosophy and 
psychology) 
Judgments arise from instinctive 
emotional reactions to case in 
hand, which may be rationalised 
by ex post reasoning 
•  No effect, if Give and 
Take frames cue same 
emotions. 
•  Frame sensitivity 
possible if Give and 
Take frames cue 
different emotions. 
•  No effect, if emotions 
are unaffected by A’s 
choice. 
•  Increasing 
condemnation possible 
if effective 
contribution by A cues 
negative emotions 
towards free rider. 
•  No effect, if emotions 
are unaffected by A’s 
choice. 
•  Increasing 
condemnation possible 
if effective 
contribution by A cues 
negative emotions 
towards free rider. 
  30Table 2. Moral evaluation of the free rider in simultaneous treatments – Regression results 




















































































































Obs. 1,365  470  680  215  1,365  470  215 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered on individuals. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Models (1) to (4): The variable 
“Tokens” takes the value “x” when Player A effectively contributes x tokens, where “x” takes on the values 0, 5, 10, 15, 20. The variable “Tokens” and its interaction with 
“Take” were excluded for the subjects whose MEF was flat. Models (1′), (2′) and (4′): Separate dummies for different levels of Person A’s effective contribution; these 
dummies also interacted with “Take”. Model (3′) would be identical to model (3) and is therefore omitted.
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Table 3. Moral evaluation of the free rider in sequential treatments – 
Regression results 
  (1) All 
subjects 















5 tokens    -27.398*** 
(2.102) 
10 tokens    -35.25*** 
(2.155) 
15 tokens    -40.586*** 
(2.148) 
20 tokens    -45.602*** 
(2.159) 
5 tokens × Take    7.596*** 
(2.848) 
10 tokens × Take    8.754*** 
(3.072) 
15 tokens × Take    8.148** 
(3.253) 






Obs. 1,325  1,325 
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered on individuals. 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Model (1): The variable “Tokens” takes the value “x” when Player 
A effectively contributes x tokens, where x takes on the values 0, 5, 10, 15, 20. Models (1′): Separate 
dummies for different levels of Person a’s effective contribution; these dummies also interacted with 
“Take”. 
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Appendix – Supplementary regressions on the role of participation fees 
 










Notes: Probit estimation. Marginal effects listed. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
The variable “Payment” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for those subjects who participated in the 
“Payment” condition and 0 otherwise. The variable “Male” is a dummy variable equal to 1 for male 
subjects and 0 otherwise. ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
 




Moral evaluations of the free rider 
Person A contributes 5 tokens  -15.571*** 
(0.923) 
Person A contributes 10 tokens  -20.314*** 
(1.046) 
Person A contributes 15 tokens  -23.942*** 
(1.133) 









Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered on 
individuals.  ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and *** at the 1-percent level. 
 
 
 
 